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e of emergency management has been 
e and priority at an accelerating rate 
ade. But the educational opportunities 
have not necessarily kept pace with this 
e volume of higher education curricu-
ed, three key thematic areas must be 
e baseline of knowledge for emergency 
ofessionals: 1) hazard and threat sci-
ical and psychological considerations, 
n/mitigation principles. 
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ency management discipline has 
ntly since its gradual transition from 
the late 1970s and early 1980s to its 
tation in the new millennium. This 
celerated significantly since the dawn 
ry, and current demands require new 
tional enhancements that were previ-
ry, or at least not as critical as in 
ment. To ensure that leaders in the 
ed, three critical areas of study must 
 emergency management education: 
hreat science, 2) sociological and psy-
derations, and 3) prevention/mitiga-
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nced emergency manager could spec-
 hazards that threaten their commu-
tion. Most could even provide back-
ecifics of the threats and the science 
e hazards. Much of this knowledge 
er a typical postemergency analysis of 
an event or from a gradual series of presentations 
and programmatic updates on specific hazards that 
are prepared for over a period of time. However, nei-
ther of these learning environments provides the 
deep understanding necessary for an emergency 
leader to effectively develop and implement strategic 
efforts to mitigate threats or to properly prepare for 
the response and recovery from their consequences. 
Additionally, the depth of understanding across the 
spectrum of hazards facing a community, business, or 
jurisdiction is unbalanced. For example, a Pacific 
Northwest emergency manager may understand, in 
geological detail, the three major earthquake threats 
to the region but may have little, if any, understand-
ing of the finer points of Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (mad cow disease). Yet the response 
complexity and consequences of the latter may cause 
as much, if not more, economic and government con-
fidence damage to the jurisdiction as would a minor 
seismic event. A Midwestern emergency manager 
may be able to go into excruciating detail about the 
genesis and meteorology of tornado formation, but if 
asked about the strategic objectives of a terrorist 
organization and how this knowledge might guide 
critical infrastructure protection priorities, the 
response might be silence. 
Emergency management leaders need an aca-
demic, not just experiential, knowledge base of the 
natural and manmade hazards that face their regions 
or facilities. They need to know the science behind the 
threats, not just the potential, operational conse-
quences should these hazards manifest themselves. The 
most effective curriculum would involve both the inclu-
sion of all the hazards an emergency manager would 
have to address and a deep analysis of the science or 
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history behind each one. Senior leaders need the tools 
to develop and set in motion strategic measures to 
address their threats, not just simple, one-dimension-
al, preparedness and response operational activities. 
But education should not end with the delivery of 
deeper threat awareness. The emergency manager 
should also be taught high-quality research and 
analysis processes as well as strategic application 
tools in order to most effectively apply this type of 
knowledge. 
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One of the flawed, yet widely believed assertions 
in the disaster field is that citizens will panic during 
a disaster. The entertainment industry has propagat-
ed this myth for decades in the depiction of fictional 
disasters rife with looting, rioting, and the struggle 
for personal survival at the expense of others. In real-
ity, except for extreme, rare circumstances, individu-
als will rush to the aid of their fellow citizens even at 
the risk of their own safety. Unfortunately, this mis-
understanding of the psychology of disaster victims 
and the actual societal response to emergency situa-
tions is not just an academic annoyance. Senior lead-
ers in charge of preparing for disasters often presume 
that panic avoidance is a critical planning considera-
tion for catastrophic scenarios, while the more proba-
ble challenge of managing masses of volunteers and 
self-responders is often ignored or minimized in 
preparation efforts. This is only one example of how a 
lack of understanding of the psychological and socio-
logical realities in emergency preparedness can lead 
to ineffective response and recovery activities. 
Senior emergency management leaders should 
possess a deeper understanding of how individuals 
process disaster scenarios as well as how to best con-
nect with citizens on the front end of preparedness as 
well as in the recovery phase. What technique will 
encourage the most citizens to prepare for disasters 
they might face? Why are most public education cam-
paigns only effective in a small percentage of those 
targeted? How will citizens react to an emergency 
alert system broadcast? Are critical incident stress 
debriefings helpful to responders and communities or 
do they do more harm than good in an unacceptable 
number of those participating in them? The average 
emergency manager does not have the tools to prop-
erly consider the deeper psychological realities of the 
victim when they develop, promote, and execute pro-
grams that are designed to encourage, prepare, and 
direct these same individuals before, during, and 
after a disaster. Mental counseling efforts are an 
established component of a disaster field office’s oper-
ations, but the importance, and therefore emphasis, 
to strongly support these activities may be absent due 
to a lack of education in this area. Efforts are stressed 
to rebuild a victim’s financial and structural circum-
stances after a disaster, but the infinitely more 
important recovery of the emotional and mental 
health of a victim is not focused upon sufficiently. 
How groups of individuals and communities react 
to emergency messaging and disaster scenarios is 
also critically important to understand. Some neigh-
borhoods vigorously seek out community emergency 
response team training while others decline the offer 
even though individual perceptions of their risk to 
disaster events may be high. Employee groups of 
some companies and workers in high rise buildings 
collectively demand safety training while those else-
where are apathetic, though not ignorant, to pre-
paredness efforts. Understanding group dynamics is 
vital to effective preparedness campaigns as well as 
group direction during an event. This area of higher 
education should include curriculum covering the 
psychological, sociological, and physiological respons-
es of individuals and groups to stressful and traumat-
ic events. Effective emergency managers need to 
know how emergency directions, disaster scene envi-
ronments, and postdisaster assistance are mentally 
processed by those targeted and affected. 
24-8-�61��)�,�161/)61��241�+12�-5 
The ultimate purpose of any emergency manage-
ment leader should be to make themselves and their 
organizations obsolete through the definitive applica-
tion of prevention and mitigation measures. The bal-
ance of resources responding to and recovering from 
disasters significantly outweighs investments in 
either preventing or at least minimizing the conse-
quences of the event. Initially, Homeland Security 
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funds for local and state efforts were allocated for 
planning, training, and equipping emergency teams 
in the aftermath of an attack, not toward preventing 
one in the first place. Only recently have policies 
changed to invest more heavily in systems, doctrine, 
and equipment that will stop an attack or harden the 
targets that are most likely at risk. In the case of nat-
ural hazards, governments have been slightly more 
aggressive in mitigation emphasis. Flood hazard 
reductions, nonstructural mitigation for earthquakes, 
and more comprehensive programs, such as Project 
Impact, have reduced and even eliminated the cata-
strophic consequences of potential hazards. However, 
the proof of successful preventive policies and invest-
ments are not always clear (i.e., if they are done well, 
nothing happens). Additionally, shifting the alloca-
tion of funds from response programs toward preven-
tion are ill advised since the cost benefit of preventive 
efforts are rarely realized in one fiscal cycle. 
The perceived inability to prove the benefits of miti-
gation actions must be overcome in order to effectively 
argue for the policies and resources necessary to achieve 
a good preventive environment. Emergency manage-
ment leaders require a higher level of understanding of 
risk management, cost-benefit analysis, land use plan-
ning, terrorist strategies and counter-terrorism pro-
grams, critical infrastructure protection, vulnerability 
assessment processes, and other areas that would enable 






preventive measures. An effective emergency manager 
should be able to successfully convince elected officials 
and executives that investment in prevention measures 
are an effective application of a jurisdiction’s or an orga-
nization’s funds, even though the benefits may not be 
realized for several years. These investments may not 
pay off in a given term of office or may be so long term 
that the benefits are not perceived at all. Therefore, 
emergency management leaders must have the tools and 
education to argue for preventive policies regardless of 
the near-term political, economic, and physical barriers 
that challenge their implementation. 
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Familiarity of emergency response operations, 
disaster rule applications, effective communications 
techniques, and executive administration are all 
good, transitional examples of the basic knowledge 
that emergency managers must possess. But to be 
effective in the implementation of policies and actions 
that truly reduce the impacts of disasters, emergency 
leaders must be educated more intensely in the back-
ground of the hazards they face, the human reactions 
to these threats, and the analytical and political tools 
to institute comprehensive prevention and mitigation 
policies. 
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Major disasters throughout history have one thing in common: the enormous number of 
people killed. Successful management of mass fatalities is often hindered by lack of informa-
tion and deeply rooted erroneous beliefs. 
The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) has released Management of Dead Bodies 
in Disaster Situations to guide decision makers charged with addressing mass fatalities. The 
timely and comprehensive guidelines are a great resource for the broad range of professionals 
called upon to act when disasters occur. For more information or to order the manual, visit 
PAHO Publications online at http://publications.paho.org. 
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